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INTRODUCTION 
In modern society social violence usually takes one of two forms. Sometimes 
those involved can be defined on the basis of their class position or revolutionary 
ideology. The violent clashes between British coal miners and the police in 1984-
85, and the terrorist campaign by the Italian Red Brigades in the seventies are good 
examples of this type of conflict. Often, however, the participants are defined in 
terms of communal identities, such as race, religion, language or national origin. 
The ethnic violence in the former Yugoslavia, or the sectarian violence in Northern 
Ireland, are obvious examples of this second type. Communal groups can be defined 
by two characteristics: first, their members have a strong ascriptive social identity, 
and second, there is a high degree of social segregation between communities. 
While the nature of the cleavage is important, there are remarkable similarities 
among communally-divided societies, regardless of whether they are divided by 
language, race or religion. ' Thus, the conflicts in Cyprus, the Basque provinces and 
Northern Ireland display striking parallels.2 Of especial significance is the tendency 
in communal conflicts for violence to lead to political polarization, which in turn 
leads to more violence in a vicious cycle. This scenario of chronic violence and 
political polarization seems to fit the recent experience of Cyprus, Northern Ireland 
and the Basque provinces of Spain. However, it obviously does not describe what 
happened in Canada. This essay will examine how Canadian politicians responded 
to violence by the Front de liberation du Quebec (FLQ) and other militant separatists 
during the period 1963-70, and suggest why this violence did not engender the kind 
of polarization that occurred elsewhere. 
This study is divided into six sections. The first examines separatist violence 
as a political issue before October 1970, and concludes that during this period 
violence was essentially a non-issue at the federal level and a minor issue in Quebec. 
The second, third and fourth sections analyze the situation during the October 
Crisis, and show that polarization occurred within the French community, rather 
than between English and French.1 The fifth section compares Quebec with 
Northern Ireland, and suggests a number of differences between the two cases that 
explain why Canada avoided the political polarization that is found in Northern 
Ireland. Some general conclusions about communal conflict are suggested in the 
final section of the article. 
FLQ terrorism took place against a background of industrial and separatist 
unrest. Separatist demonstrations often turned violent — or were violently 
suppressed by the police. Bloody rioting marked the celebration of St. Jean Baptiste 
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Day in 1964, 1968 and 1969. Disturbances occurred in October 1964 during the 
visit of Queen Elizabeth and in May 1965 on Victoria Day. A series of clashes took 
place in 1967-68 between Francophone demonstrators and Anglophone parents 
during the St. Leonard's school dispute. The 1968 "McGill français" march, which 
ended in looting and vandalism, was also inspired by radical nationalism. 
The FLQ campaign began in 1963, with the number of incidents peaking in 
that year and again during 1968-70. Bombings were the most common kind of 
attack (70 percent), followed by robberies (22 percent). Three-quarters of all the 
attacks occurred within Montreal. The violence claimed only a handful of lives. 
The first victim was a 65-year old night watchman blown up by a bomb in April 
1963. The last was the Quebec Minister of Labour Pierre Laporte, who was 
murdered by his kidnappers in October 1970. (The major incidents of separatist 
violence are listed in Table 1). The kidnapping of James Cross, the British Trade 
Commissioner, and of Laporte, represented a significant escalation of the FLQ's 
campaign and one would expect a marked increase in the amount of political 
attention paid to the issue. In fact, the increase is so dramatic that the whole period 
can be divided into two which will be examined separately.4 
SEPARATIST VIOLENCE AS A POLITICAL ISSUE BEFORE 
OCTOBER 1970 
Prior to October 1970, little overt attention was paid to the FLQ by federal 
politicians. In the House of Commons there were only a handful of speeches on the 
topic, virtually all in response to specific acts of violence by the FLQ or separatist 
demonstrators. Most incidents provoked only a few questions or comments, while 
several passed unnoticed (or at least unnoted) by the MPs. On 17 May 1963, a 
question was asked about explosions in mail boxes, and five days later, another 
criticized the ineffectiveness of the RCMP in tracking down the perpetrators.5 On 
31 August 1964, Conservative Party leader John Diefenbaker asked what steps were 
being taken by the police in response to an arms theft by the FLQ.6 Even when a 
bomb exploded in the House of Commons building in May 1966, there were only 
four brief references to the event.7 FLQ attacks received slightly more attention than 
did riots and demonstrations. 
Many speakers called for the government to respond by increasing security 
precautions, directing the RCMP to investigate bombing incidents or offering 
rewards for information. Almost invariably the policies proposed can be character-
ized as hardline. For example, after the bombing of the Department of National 
Defence building, one backbencher asked, "As a result of this horrible crime, will 
the minister promptly introduce amendments to the Criminal Code of Canada which 
would call for capital punishment for all persons found guilty of homicide resulting 
from the setting of bombing devices and other acts of terror?"8 The Minister of 
Justice, John Turner, described the bombing of the Defence building as "a savage, 
cowardly and insane act" and expressed his sympathy to the victims' families.9 
Apart from condemning the FLQ and the demonstrators themselves, politicians 
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blamed "professional agitators" and "marxists" for inciting the violence. Only one 
speaker, a Conservative representing a Quebec constituency, hinted that social 
grievances might play a causal role or that reforms were required. He noted that a 
Royal Commission had recently found French-Canadians to have the lowest wages 
of any ethnic group, and suggested a link between unemployment and social unrest. 
Only a handful of MPs were active in the issue and most of these individuals 
only participated once or twice.,0 A majority were from outside Quebec (64 percent) 
and a minority (42 percent) were French. The Progressive Conservatives and the 
Creditistes were most likely to ask questions about the issue, and 83 percent of the 
speeches came from these two groups. No obvious differences can be seen in the 
attitudes of French and English MPs, or between those from Quebec and those from 
other provinces. Political violence was virtually a non-issue in federal politics prior 
to October 1970. Opposition MPs made sporadic attempts to score political points, 
but spokesmen for the Liberal government dismissed their concerns." 
Since almost all separatist violence took place within Quebec, the issue had 
more salience at the provincial level. However, even in Quebec the issue received 
only sporadic attention. The initial wave of FLQ attacks in 1963-64, as well as the 
bombing of the Stock Exchange in 1969, produced condemnation and announce-
ments of government counter-measures. A certain polarization along party lines is 
apparent. In 1963-64, the governing Liberals took a hardline stance with Premier 
Jean Lesage arguing that, "When the police have to fight to crush a revolutionary 
anarchist movement, it's time for them to use all their powers even extraordinary 
ones !'"2 Independentistes saw things differently, and Pierre Bourgault declared that 
although Rassemblement Pour l'Indépendence Nationale (RIN) was "opposed to 
violence . . . the real guilty parties are not the people who favour revolution: they 
are the people who make it inevitable."13 After the bombing of the Montreal Stock 
Exchange, Premier Jean-Jacques Bertrand declared, "We will not rest until the last 
of the anarchists still at large has been captured,"14 and his Union National 
government increased the reward for the capture of FLQ terrorists. Although 
condemning the bombing as an "out-and-out barbarous act" René Levesque of the 
Parti Québécois went on to add that terrorism is a "symptom of illness, not its 
cause . . .terrorism will threaten us until we have cured its underlying causes, which 
are, first and foremost, gaping and neglected social wounds and the frustrations to 
which they give rise."15 
Press coverage serves as another indicator of issue salience and reveals a 
similar pattern. The English language media, for the most part, ignored bom the 
FLQ and separatist demonstrations. The disturbances in Montreal during the 
Queen's visit in 1964, and the savage riots on St. Jean Baptiste Day in 1968 were 
the only significant exceptions.16 French-language newspapers gave the militant 
separatists more coverage, but the first FLQ communique was published only in Le 
Devoir and the full text was not reproduced. The death of night watchman Wilfrid 
O'Neill on 20 April 1963 drew a shocked reaction from both La Presse ("The FLQ's 
first murder")17 and Le Devoir. An editorial in the latter condemned "the fireworks 
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of hate," and went on to say, 'The hidden ones pretend they are acting in the name 
of French-Canadian nationalism; they do their best to dishonor it. French-
Canadians, whatever their affiliation, are on the side of the victim." Thereafter, even 
the most spectacular attacks were often relegated to the inside pages.18 Magazines 
and journals also paid little attention to the group.'9 
The absence of pre-1970 public opinion polling data on attitudes toward the 
FLQ notwithstanding, evidence suggests that their supporters were vociferous and 
well organized. The first support group was formed in 1966 after "a group of 
Christians at the University of Montreal" sent a letter to Le Devoir expressing their 
solidarity with Pierre Vallieres and Charles Gagnon. Demonstrations were organ-
ized against "political repression" (i.e. the sentencing of FLQ members for acts of 
terrorism), and were able to mobilize thousands on several occasions. In 1970 the 
Comité d'aide Vallieres-Gagnon became the Movement de defense des prisonniers 
politiques au Quebec (MDPPQ). The MDPPQ opposed the anti-terrorist bill passed 
by the Quebec Assembly in 1969 and undertook to raise $50,000 to defend political 
prisoners. The sum was chosen symbolically, since it was the same amount set aside 
by the government to pay informers. But separatist violence remained a minor issue 
at the provincial level until October 1970, when the FLQ's kidnappings of Cross and 
Laporte provoked a national crisis. 
THE OCTOBER CRISIS AND THE PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE 
After the kidnapping of Cross on 5 October and of Laporte a few days later, 
the federal government responded by invoking the War Measures Act (WMA), 
arresting several hundred people and mobilizing troops and police in province-wide 
searches for the missing men. Negotiations with the FLQ fell through and, on 17 
October, Laporte was murdered. However, in early December the police discovered 
the hideout of the FLQ cell which was holding Cross, and he was released safely in 
return for his kidnappers' safe conduct to Cuba. In this section the parliamentary 
debate over these events will be analyzed in terms of its themes, the positions that 
were taken and the cleavages that it revealed. The analysis is based upon 301 
speeches during the 6 October to 1 December period.20 
Certain themes were raised repeatedly. There were expressions of concern 
over the threat posed by the FLQ. In announcing the proclamation of the War 
Measures Act Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau referred to the "seriousness of the 
present situation... the fate of the two kidnapped hostages weighs very heavily on 
my mind as it does on all of us."21 A Liberal member saw the dangers as obvious: 
"Let us recall all the events. First there were the kidnappings, then the threats to life 
and private property . . . there have been bombings, thefts of dynamite and acts of 
violence of every kind."22 David Lewis of the New Democratic Party, alluded to 
"the very serious and critical situation."23 
One frequent criticism was that the government had ignored previous 
warnings about the dangers posed by the FLQ and other radicals. Former Prime 
Minister Diefenbaker made a lengthy speech detailing several such instances. 
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What, he inquired, was the Secretary of State's attitude now "after two occasions 
on which he stood up in this House and said there was nothing in the argument of 
the leader of the Creditistes, that in the province of Quebec, there were several 
people in Radio Canada who were members of the FLQ. Why were proceedings not 
taken against the wrongdoers in the Company of Young Canadians?"24 However, 
by end of October several MPs had begun to express doubts about the extent and 
nature of the threat, and had called for a commission of inquiry into the whole affair. 
There was strong condemnation of the FLQ and their actions from all sides. 
Speaking for the NDP, its leader Tommy Douglas said that they were "appalled and 
disgusted by the abduction of two innocent men."25 A Liberal called them "traitors 
and bandits," while a Conservative denounced the "forces of evil at work in Quebec 
. . . the incipient venom of the FLQ."26 Nobody defended or justified the violence, 
but there were occasional attempts to explain it by reference to the social conditions 
in Quebec. This view was expressed almost exclusively by members of the NDP. 
Douglas argued, 
We must go back to the root cause. A revolutionary movement has to 
have a base. Where is the base of the FLQ? The base of the FLQ lies 
in the disadvantaged and unfortunate people in the province of 
Quebec. I am suggesting to the government that no revolutionary 
movement can become a menace unless it has the support of the 
disadvantaged and alienated groups.27 
This interpretation was vigorously rejected by other speakers. Real Caouette 
(leader of the Creditistes) denied "that those responsible for the abductions or the 
current situation in Quebec are destitute people It is quite untrue that the FLQ 
is made up of disadvantaged, poor people who live in slums." Instead he blamed 
the unrest on revolutionary agitators. 'Those students have been roused by others, 
by people who told them: 'Let us get together to upset the established order.'"28 This 
was an extremely popular position, and there was a general consensus as to who 
these subversive forces were. They included foreign revolutionaries, the Company 
of Young Canadians and radicals in the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. A 
Francophone Conservative argued that "Our immigration regulations have not been 
strict enough. We have admitted from Algeria people who have come here to preach 
revolution. We have admitted Cubans who have come to set up Maoist groups in 
Montreal, Quebec and Trois-Rivieres."29 
There were predictable partisan disagreements over how to respond to the 
crisis. The NDP and Progressive Conservatives were concerned about the threat to 
civil liberties from the WMA. Lewis of the NDP called the response of the federal 
government "excessive, hysterical and unacceptable."30 Eldon Woolliams, a Con-
servative from Alberta, objected to the fact that all the provinces were covered by 
the WMA. "What is going on in Alberta tonight that they need this kind of law? 
What is going on in British Columbia that they need this kind of law? Indeed what 
is going on in Manitoba or in Ontario or the Maritimes?"31 Supporters of the WMA 
denied that ordinary citizens would be affected by the measures. "Only the quarter 
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of one percent of the Quebec population who live outside the law and pursue the 
aims and objectives of the FLQ would be disturbed by the police," said Guilbeault, 
a Quebec Liberal. LaSalle, a Conservative, agreed. "I do not believe that anybody 
in my parish is or has been annoyed by police . . . . The job of the police is not to 
bother innocent people."32 
It is interesting to note what themes were not raised or are mentioned only 
rarely. There were, for example, very few complaints about the behavior of the 
soldiers or police, or claims that they used excessive force or otherwise abused the 
population.33 Several speakers were careful to distinguish between separatism as 
a political philosophy and the activities of the FLQ, and to dissociate the PQ from 
the FLQ. 
The themes of the 301 speeches are shown in Table 2. (Since most speeches 
emphasized several themes, the total sums to more than 100 percent) When 
Francophone MPs are compared to the rest, no obvious polarization along ethnic 
lines can be seen. The Francophones seemed to be slightly more concerned about 
the FLQ threat, or at least were less likely to voice skepticism about it. They were 
more likely to reject the argument that violence is caused by unemployment, and 
more likely to blame the media for spreading revolutionary and separatist ideas. A 
greater proportion expressed support for the WMA, and far fewer expressed 
concerns about the effect of the WMA on civil liberties. The issue of federal-
provincial relations was brought up more often by Quebec MPs than by those from 
other provinces. In particular, the question of whether Quebec or the Federal 
Government would pay the costs of deploying the military was raised repeatedly. 
There was, certainly, no sign of a unified Francophone bloc ranged against the 
Anglophones. The slight differences between the two groups appear to reflect the 
partisan composition of each bloc (i.e. a greater proportion of Francophones were 
Liberals). Party affiliation was more significant than ethnicity, and Francophone 
Liberals and Francophone Conservatives often criticized one another. The two 
votes on the WMA and the Public Order Act which succeeded it also revealed the 
lack of ethnic polarization. A motion approving the use of the WMA was passed 
190 to 16 (with all the 16 being non-Francophone New Democrats). The Public 
Order Act was passed 174 to 31, with 46 French-Canadians voting for, and 10 
against. 
THE PRESS AND THE OCTOBER CRISIS 
The press played several roles throughout the period: they reported the 
actions of the FLQ and the government, they provided a platform for opinions to be 
expressed, and they themselves editorialized on the issues. The press both reflected 
and shaped public opinion. In their editorials the newspapers, for the most part, 
condemned the FLQ and supported tough policies against them, while rejecting 
negotiations and concessions.34 For example, the Toronto Star called for "a massive 
police drive by both federal and provincial authorities to smash this pestilent 
organization once and for all. And if special criminal legislation is needed to secure 
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this result, Parliament should give it early consideration at the present session."35 
The Winnipeg Free Press asserted that "the FLQ was guilty of treason — and that 
death remained the penalty for treason."36 The media generally supported the War 
Measures Act, though they often expressed concerns about civil liberties. This 
resulted in a certain ambivalent tone in many editorials. 
To the Winnipeg Free Press it was a "desperate cure, an unhappy choice 
between anarchy and a period of repressive government."37 The Globe and Mail 
made a similar argument. "Only if we can believe that the Government has evidence 
that the FLQ is strong enough and sufficiently armed to escalate the violence that 
it has spawned for seven years now, only then can the Government's assumption of 
incredible powers be tolerated."38 The Toronto Star "would have much preferred 
to see the Trudeau Government justify this drastic step to Parliament before taking 
it and to claim only those powers under the act which are absolutely necessary to 
deal with the Quebec situation. The civil liberties of Canadians are not to be lightly 
suspended."39 The Sudbury Star was even more skeptical. "Mr. Trudeau must 
convince us all that his action was neither irresponsible nor ill-considered; that it 
was, in fact, the only course he could take. Mr. Trudeau must tell us, too, why the 
Canadian Government failed to recognize armed revolution in its early stage and 
thereby to take adequate steps against it."40 
After the murder of Laporte, however, doubts disappeared and positions 
hardened. The Halifax Chronicle-Herald wrote that "the loud protestations of 
misguided people, in Quebec and elsewhere in Canada, about the loss of 'demo-
cratic rights'... have a mocking ring in the aftermath of Mr. Laporte's murder."41 
The Globe and Mail warned that "those who have taken to the streets and the public 
squares with their bullhorns to attack the courageous stand of the Canadian 
Government in this grave hour should be plainly informed that the vast majority of 
our people are no longer in a mood to indulge in long and academic arguments about 
possible threats to our civil liberties."42 The Toronto Telegram urged all MPs to vote 
for the War Measures Act.43 
If the editorial positions taken are cross-tabulated against the language and 
region of the newspaper, the consensus appears less impressive. Although the 
English-language newspapers, both inside and outside Quebec, were uniformly 
hostile to the FLQ and generally supported the government and its hardline policies, 
the French language press were more divided. 
La Presse took a consistently hardline stand. On 6 October it argued that 
"neither the municipal government, the provincial government, nor the federal 
government should at any time give in to this blackmail... there is something even 
more disgusting than blackmail and that is to give into blackmail."44 A later editorial 
gloomily predicted that "When the terrorists have been locked up, they will be tried 
according to the laws that govern us They will begin to have the air of victims 
and will look like heroes. In Cuba these men would be killed on sight the instant 
they were identified."45 
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Le Devoir initially favored negotiations with the FLQ, but after the murder 
of Laporte, which it condemned with "horror and repulsion," it shifted its position 
and accepted that exceptional measures were necessary. However, it urged that they 
be applied "with maximum discretion since the exclusive use of protective devices 
and manhunts will not solve much, however, over a long-term period."4* Claude 
Ryan, the editor of Le Devoir, was concerned that Quebec's autonomy had been 
compromised during the crisis and that premier Bourassa had allowed the federal 
government to dominate. He returned to this topic repeatedly. Even after the killing 
of Laporte he argued that "our immediate aim is not to save the prestige or authority 
of this person or that, but to save democracy in Quebec."47 Eventually, this 
consideration led Ryan to urge Bourassa to form a provisional government com-
posed of all Quebec parties and political personalities. (Although various individu-
als were contacted, nothing came of this attempt.)411 
The leftist and pro-Separatist Quebec-Presse thought the FLQ's analysis of 
Quebec society was , 
well-founded and correct. . .. There were many signs of the innate 
corruption within our political and economic system . . . . In answer 
to this violence the FLQ responds with violence. A type of violence 
aimed at getting rid of the oppressors to replace them with a political 
and economic system based on the needs of the people of Quebec and 
controlled by them.49 
Not only did Quebec-Presse offer a justification of the FLQ, but even after 
Laporte's death, they refused to condemn the action. "It is too easy to say that Pierre 
Laporte was killed by a handful of terrorists. But who put the gun into their hands? 
. . . I refuse to pass judgment."50 The editors called for passive resistance against the 
War Measures Act, which they saw as protecting only the ruling class. "For proof 
one only has to see where the military have been posted in the Montreal area. There 
are very few in the Francophone eastern section and there are very many in 
Westmount. It is the owner minority which must be protected. The army is not in 
Quebec to protect the population. It is in Quebec to protect the owners."51 
The findings of this sample of editorials are consistent with Arthur Siegel's 
more systematic analysis. Siegel found that in their coverage of the crisis, the 
French-language papers emphasized the theme of negotiation, while the English-
language papers emphasized the manhunt, and that the Francophone press was more 
concerned with the relationship between the Quebec and federal governments. As 
one might expect, the Francophone focus was on the consequences for Quebec, 
while the Anglophone papers had a wider Canadian perspective.52 Siegel concludes 
that in their editorials, 
English newspapers were more hostile to terrorism generally and the 
FLQ specifically, provided far stronger support for both the Ottawa 
and Quebec governments, enthusiastically endorsed the decision to 
invoke the War Measures Act and emphasized consistently their 
support and concern for Canadian unity. 
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French editorialists provided extremely strong support for 
negotiations, had a comparatively low support level for Canadian 
unity, generally did not relate separatism to terrorism .. . . Social and 
economic injustices, almost always associated with French Canadi-
ans in the editorials, were a frequently raised issue and a matter of 
considerable concern. French papers were far more concerned about 
what was happening to civil rights in Canada.5' 
However, the differences between the two groups was usually one of degree. For 
example, 95 percent of the English editorials were "strongly opposed" to the FLQ 
and 5 percent were "opposed," while the comparable figures for the French 
editorials were 67 percent and 23 percent. Siegel's data also show that while the 
English papers overwhelmingly supported the WMA (93 percent were strongly 
favorable or favorable), the French papers were more divided with 69 percent in 
favor and 23 percent opposed. 
PUBLIC OPINION AND ORGANIZED GROUPS DURING THE CRISIS 
During the debates in the House of Commons, several speakers referred to 
public revulsion against the kidnappers and support for the WMA.54 The polls 
confirm this assessment. An October survey found that 78 percent of Montrealers 
"totally disapproved" of the kidnappings, and a majority thought the maintenance 
of law and order more important than saving two lives.55 The polls on attitudes to 
the WMA suggest a rather strange fluctuation, but reveal that a clear majority 
supported the act throughout the period.56 Initially, French respondents were 
noticeably less in favor, but by December the level of support in both groups was 
very similar. 
Although the supporters of the FLQ constituted only a small minority, they 
were highly visible. During the October Crisis there were mass rallies in favor of 
the FLQ as well as teach-ins and student strikes.57 At the Université de Montreal, 
social science students voted to strike, while at the Université de Quebec students 
occupied the administrative offices and promised to keep the campus closed "until 
the victory of the FLQ." At several junior colleges teach-ins took place to study the 
FLQ manifesto.5* The activists who demonstrated in favor of the FLQ and against 
the WMA seem to have been primarily students and intellectuals. Although some 
radical trade unionists were also involved, few ordinary, blue-collar workers 
participated in the protests.59 Thus, those taking part in FLQ protest marches 
included the president of l'Alliance des professeurs de Montreal, the president of le 
Syndicat de fonctionnaires provinciaux, an ex-president of la Corporation des 
enseignants du Quebec, and the president of le Syndicat de la construction de 
Montreal. Pelletier mockingly remarked that "one of the chief strategic successes 
of the FLQ is to have succeeded in ranging against the Government almost all the 
Quebec intellectuals and even a portion of the Anglophone intellectuals of Canada."60 
The only major organization significantly involved in the issue was the 
Confederation of National Trade Unions. With two other unions they condemned 
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the WMA as a "regime of force imposed by the Trudeau government."61 Other 
organizations that expressed support for the FLQ, or opposition to the WMA, 
included the Quebec Federation of Labor, the Quebec Teachers Union, the Jeunesse 
Ouvrière Chrétienne, the Quebec Civil Liberties Union, and the Quebec New 
Democrats. Even the Pastoral Council of the Archdiocese of Quebec issued a 
statement sympathizing with the goals of the FLQ, and condemning the WMA.62 
In assessing the effect of the October Crisis on public attitudes we can also 
consider election results. On 25 October municipal elections were held in Montreal 
and Front d'Action Politique (FRAP), a coalition of students, intellectuals and trade 
unions, was soundly beaten by Mayor Jean Drapeau's Civic Party, which obtained 
92 percent of the vote.63 The election was seen as a referendum on the FLQ and the 
WMA. Drapeau had called for federal intervention to stop an "apprehended 
insurrection," while FRAP had been ambivalent — to say the least — about the 
FLQ. Paul Cliche, the leader of FRAP, declared at a mass rally that FRAP's "main 
objective is the accession of the workers of Quebec to political and economic power 
and in this sense, it agrees with the FLQ."64 They did not endorse but did not 
condemn FLQ violence, and Jean Marchand, a federal cabinet minister, accused 
them of being a "front" for the FLQ. 
A COMPARISON BETWEEN QUEBEC AND NORTHERN IRELAND 
In the late 1960s while the FLQ was active, so was the Irish Republican 
Army (IRA). Indeed in one of their communiques, the FLQ expressed solidarity 
with "the revolutionary Catholics of Northern Ireland." Several writers have 
pointed to the similarities between the two countries,65 yet FLQ violence never 
polarized Canada in the way that IRA violence polarized Northern Ireland. In 
Ulster, Protestants and Catholics have very different attitudes toward antiterrorist 
policies. For example, 52 percent of Protestants supported internment as com-
pared to only 5 percent of Catholics (since the vast majority of those interned were 
Catholic republican activists). Divisions within the general public are mirrored by 
partisan disagreement among politicians, with Nationalists almost invariably 
favoring softline and Unionists hardline policies. Internment itself produced 
bitter division with the SDLP calling for civil disobedience and refusing to 
participate in constitutional discussions with the British government until the 
policy was ended. Unionists, for the most part, supported internment as an 
effective means of dealing with the IRA. The SDLP favored negotiations with the 
IRA, the Unionist parties were opposed. The SDLP wanted concessions made to 
the hunger strikers, the Unionists opposed any concessions. The Unionists 
favored capital punishment for terrorists, the SDLP was opposed.66 
There are three interrelated factors which explain the ability of Canada to 
avoid this polarization: the political position of French-Canadians, the ideology and 
campaign of the FLQ, and the impact of the WMA on the Quebec population. 
Radicals in Northern Ireland and Quebec used exactly the same metaphor to 
describe ethnic relations. Pierre Vallieres called the French "Nègres blancs,"67 
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while to Liam de Paor "Northern Irish Catholics are blacks who happen to have a 
white skin."68 If interpreted in an economic sense the comparison is somewhat 
exaggerated but plausible. One frequently cited measure of racial disadvantage in 
the United States is that a black household in 1960 received only 60 percent of the 
income received by a white household. In Northern Ireland the comparable 
Catholic-Protestant statistic was 85 percent while in Quebec the French disadvan-
tage was somewhat greater, with Francophone workers earning only 80 percent of 
the wage paid to Anglophone workers.69 In terms of occupational differences, 
Quebec is also more like the United States than is Northern Ireland, as table 5 shows. 
These facts show that one cannot explain the different levels of violence and 
political polarization in Quebec and Northern Ireland as a result of the differences 
in their class structure. If economic disadvantage explains the severity of the 
Northern Irish conflict, then presumably the level of violence in Quebec should 
have been even greater. Thus I would dismiss Aunger's claim that in Northern 
Ireland "class conflict is synonymous with religious conflict because . . . it is the 
Protestants who are advantaged and the Catholics disadvantaged."70 
Despite the economic parallels between French-Canadians and Northern 
Irish Catholics, there were profound differences in their political situation. 
Unlike Ulster Catholics who were excluded from political power at both the 
national and the provincial level, French-Canadians played a significant role at 
the federal level, and dominated Quebec politics. They were part of the system, 
not alienated from it. Thus in October 1970, not only the prime minister but one 
quarter of the federal cabinet were Francophones.71 Furthermore, the link 
between politics and ethnicity in Canada at the elite level was very different from 
that in Northern Ireland. In Northern Ireland all Catholic politicians are nation-
alists and all nationalist politicians are Catholics. The result is that political 
debate in Northern Ireland is inevitably sectarian in its nature, with Catholics 
aligned against Protestants. However, in Canada, Francophone MPs could be 
found in the Liberal party, in the Progressive Conservative party and in the 
Ralliement Creditiste, while in Quebec, they dominated the Liberals, the Union 
National and the Parti Québécois. In Canada, therefore, political debate is as 
likely to pit Anglophones against other Anglophones, and Francophones against 
Francophones, rather than along ethnic lines. 
These political differences are largely a-result of demography. Since they 
constitute almost a third of the Canadian electorate, French-Canadians cannot be 
ignored by federal politicians, and as the majority in Quebec they effectively control 
provincial politics. The electoral option for French-Canadians—even if mey seek 
an independent Quebec—makes more sense than armed struggle. Why support the 
FLQ when you can support the PQ?72 For Northern Irish Catholics the electoral 
possibilities are less appealing. They elected only three Westminster MPs so their 
influence in UK politics was trivial. Within Northern Ireland, they were a minority 
condemned to political impotence by sectarian bloc voting. McCann describes how 
nationalists thought Irish unity might be achieved. "Some said that Catholics 
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because of their higher birth-rate would one day outnumber Protestants in the six 
counties... and then there were always those who said that sooner or later we were 
going to have to fight for it."73 
The political role played by French-Canadians meant that the ideology of the 
FLQ was very different from that of the IRA despite some superficial similarities. 
The IRA is a classic example of a nationalist group, and its goal is a thirty-two 
county Irish Republic. Although some of its leaders espouse a vaguely socialist 
rhetoric, this is irrelevant to its military strategy and popular support. Rhetorically 
and in practice its targets are defined in ethnic/national terms: the British and the 
Protestants. The FLQ is more difficult to classify, because its targets and ideology 
changed significantly from 1963 to 1970. In the beginning, they attacked targets 
symbolizing English domination, their first manifesto was addressed to "patriots" 
and the enemy was "Anglo-Saxon colonialism." By 1966, under the influence of 
Pierre Vallieres and Charles Gagnon, the FLQ ideology became increasingly 
Marxist and their strategy shifted to "the defense of the workers."74 During the 
October Crisis, the FLQ's communiques emphasized the class character of their 
enemies. Their manifesto, broadcast over Radio-Canada, is a good example. 
The Front de liberation du Quebec is a group of Quebec workers who 
have decided to use every means to make sure that the people of 
Quebec take control of their destiny. The Front de liberation du 
Quebec wants the total independence of all Québécois, united in a free 
society, purged forever of the clique of voracious sharks, the patron-
izing big bosses and their henchmen who have made Quebec their 
hunting preserve for cheap labour and unscrupulous exploitation. The 
Front de liberation du Quebec is not a movement of aggression, but 
is a response to the aggression organized by high finance and the 
puppet governments in Ottawa and Quebec.75 
However, the political role played by French-Canadians, as "henchmen" of 
the bosses in the "puppet governments," meant that for the FLQ they were the enemy 
as much as the Anglo-Saxon capitalists. Indeed, within Quebec separatist writings, 
there is an emphasis on "le roi nègre" which is virtually absent from Irish 
republicanism.76 Yet, to attack fellow ethnics is very dangerous for nationalist 
terrorists since such attacks undercut the ethnic solidarity upon which these groups 
depend for their support. The IRA rarely kills Catholics and when it does, goes to 
great lengths to justify the action. The FLQ not only deliberately murdered Laporte, 
but most victims of FLQ bombings were working class French-Canadians.77 
Nationalist insurgents who harm their own people can hardly expect to receive 
much support. Consequently, the result of the FLQ campaign was a polarization not 
between French and English, but within the French community. The alignments 
resemble those found during outbreaks of revolutionary terrorism. Revolutionary 
terrorists typically recruit and draw their support from young, students and intellec-
tuals, as did the FLQ. 
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Jerrold Post suggests that the psychological dynamics of nationalist and 
revolutionary groups are completely different.78 For the youth of Belfast becoming 
a terrorist is an act of loyalty to anti-regime parents; for the youth of Germany or 
Italy it is an act of dissent against parents loyal to the regime. Thus the high degree 
of support for the IRA among the Catholic community is rooted in a tradition of 
militant nationalism, which is transmitted through family, church and school. Most 
Irish nationalists are nationalists for the same reason that they are Roman Catholics 
— because they were taught to be so. In McCann's words, "We came very early to 
our politics. One learned quite literally at one's mother's knee that Christ died for 
the human race, and Patrick Pearse for the Irish section of it." He goes on to describe 
how all the institutions of the Catholic community in Derry inculcated and 
reinforced these nationalist beliefs. Devlin describes her "militantly republican 
school," its vice-principal Mother Benignus (to whom "everything English was 
bad. She hated the English"), and how "their combined effect... turned me into 
a convinced republican."79 
In Quebec, such a tradition was absent, and the FLQ activists were rebelling 
against their parents' values. Psychologist Gustave Morf describes their ideals as 
involving "the rejection of the father, and the values he represents; impatience with 
the constitutional process and accepted morality; a simplistic view of world politics; 
and the substitution of a Maoist new religion for a Catholic upbringing."80 
The WMA did not have the alienating and polarizing effects that British 
counter-insurgency policy had in Northern Ireland, despite the similarities between 
them. In both cases, there were troops deployed, house searches and mass arrests. 
Such measures not only disrupt public life, but often result in abuses by the security 
forces. The Quebec Provincial Police were accused of using mock executions to 
make prisoners confess, beatings and other abuses. In both Northern Ireland and 
Quebec most of those arrested appear to have been innocent in that they were later 
released without charge.81 
However, unlike Northern Ireland where no Catholic politician supported 
the emergency measures, French-Canadian politicians from Quebec and most of the 
French language press were as hardline as their Anglophone counterparts. Hence 
the WMA was legitimized for most Quebeckers by their political leaders. Even 
more important was the character of the security forces. In Northern Ireland both 
the British Army and the RUC are composed of outsiders. Catholics are arrested by 
Protestant policemen, their houses searched by English soldiers. Given the 
hostilities between these groups, there are more likely to be abuses by the security 
forces, and their actions are likely to produce hostile confrontations. In Quebec, 
since those engaged in security operations were French-Canadians, this factor did 
not provoke such bitter antagonism among those affected by the WMA.82 Almost 
all arrests were carried out by the Quebec Provincial Police (QPP) and the Montreal 
Municipal Police. Federal troops were deployed around government buildings and 
to guard government officials, but were not used to search houses or make arrests. 
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Surveys show that the Quebec population had a positive image of the police, and 
were satisfied with the way they carried out their duties.1" 
CONCLUSIONS 
This article has attempted to do two things: first, to show that separatist 
violence in Canada did not lead to polarization between the Francophone and 
Anglophone communities and politicians; second, by comparing Canada to North-
ern Ireland, to identify the factors that produced this benign outcome. Two general 
points concerning communal conflict — one substantive, the other methodological 
— can be suggested on the basis of these findings. 
The dominant paradigm in analyzing communal conflicts, which might be 
called the civil rights or grievance model, is derived from the race-relations dispute 
in the United States. This view assumes that most communal conflicts are rooted 
in discrimination which results in the minority being economically deprived, or 
denied full social equality. The Quebec case certainly does not fit this model, 
probably because the model is inappropriate? Throughout the contemporary world 
the most violent and enduring conflicts between communal groups involve nation-
alist demands for political changes, not economic amelioration. If multi-ethnic 
states can devise a political framework to accommodate minority identities, they 
will avoid violent conflicts, regardless of economic disparities between groups. 
Federalism appears to be an effective strategy of accommodation, and is associated 
with low levels of violence in several societies, including Switzerland, Belgium and 
Canada. There may also be a methodological rationale for studying such societies: 
to see if any other characteristics can be identified that explain their ability to resolve 
communal conflicts peacefully. Indeed, Quebec may be significant for the study of 
violence primarily because of what did not happen. 
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Table 1 
Major FLQ Incidents of Separatist Violence 1963-70 
April 1963 
May 1963 
August 1964 
October 1964 
May 1965 
May 1966 
May 1966 
July 1966 
June 1968 
b. Wilfrid O'Neill killed 
b. Sergeant Major wounded 
b. robbery—owner of gun store and employee killed 
demonstrations against Queen's visit (police brutality) 
violent demonstrations on Victoria Day (150 arrests) 
b. Thérèse Morin killed—three wounded 
b. House of Commons (man who set bomb killed) 
b. Jean Corbo (FLQ) killed 
St. Jean Baptiste Day Riot (250 injured, 292 
November 1968 St. Leonard demonstration, vandalism 
January 1969 b. 2 wounded 
February 1969 b. 1 wounded 
b. 27 wounded (Stock Exchange) 
b. 4 wounded 
March 1969 Operation McGill Francais (18 injured) 
June 1969 St. Jean Baptiste Day Riot 
June 1970 b. Jeanne D' Arc Saint-Germain killed —2 wounded 
October 1970 kidnapping of James Cross and Pierre Laporte 
Laporte murdered 
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Table 2 
Opinions Expressed in House of Commons Speeches 
All MPs French MPs 
Concern over threat from FLQ 
Government slow to act in the past 
Doubts about threat from FLQ/ 
WMA unnecessary 
Condemn violence by FLQ 
Violence caused by unemployment, etc. 
Violence not a result of unemployment 
Blame foreign revolutionaries, 
Algeria, Cuba 
Blame CBC/Media 
Blame Company of Young Canadians 
Support WMA/hardline 
(e.g. capital punishment) 
Offer rewards 
Civil liberties concerns, abuses 
Need for reforms 
Use security forces/support s.f. 
Negotiate with FLQ 
Don't negotiate with FLQ 
Provincial-Federal relations 
Anti-separatism 
FLQ not same as PQ 
FRAP and Montreal elections 
Police efficiency, coordination 
Favor New Public Order Bill 
Compensation for wrongful arrests 
Other 
41 
9 
12 
21 
3 
8 
23 
20 
8 
38 
68 
92 
11 
7 
4 
3 
37 
14 
7 
16 
16 
5 
3 
21 
15 
1 
1 
3 
-
4 
9 
4 
5 
23 
-
9 
6 
4 
1 
1 
24 
9 
2 
5 
1 
2 
2 
4 
(Total number of speeches) (301) (88) 
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Table 3 
Editorial Positions Taken by Newspapers 
Condemn FLQ violence/ 
FLQ has no support 
No negotiations/get tough/ 
pro WMA 
Anti-WMA/counter productive/ 
civil liberties concerns 
Pro-negotiations/concessions 
Justification of FLQ 
Federalism/Quebec autonomy 
Other 
English 
7 
24 
10 
1 
-
1 
2 
French 
10 
10 
4 
3 
4 
3 
-
Table 4 
Attitudes to War Measures Act 
19 Oct 1970,l) 15Novl970<2) 
Support 60 
Oppose 12 
Don't Know 28 
English Only 
Support 73 
Oppose 8 
French Only 
Support 51 
Oppose 15 
Sources: (1) Toronto Star 
(2) Omnifacts 
(3) CROP 
(4) Gallup Canada 
85 
10 
5 
-
-
-
-
27 Nov 197<P 
73 
16 
11 
87 
-
70 
-
14 Dec 1970<4) 
87 
6 
7 
89 
5 
86 
9 
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Table 5 
Male Occupational Distributions by Ethnicity in Three Societies 
Northern Ireland Quebec USA 
(1971) (1961) (1960) 
Prot Catholic English French White Black 
Prof/Managerial 
Lower non manual 
Skilled manual 
Semi-skilled 
manual 
16 
17 
27 
24 
9 
12 
23 
25 
15 
13 
-
-
6 
7 
-
-
25 
16 
23 
22 
7 
7 
12 
27 
Unskilled manual 16 32 4 12 15 47 
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